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The Automation of Legal Reasoning: Customized AI
Techniques for the Patent Field
Dean Alderucci*
ABSTRACT
As Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning continue to
transform numerous aspects of our everyday lives, their role in the
legal profession is growing in prominence. A subfield of Al with
particular applicability to legal analysis is Natural Language Pro-
cessing (NLP). NLP deals with computational techniques for pro-
cessing human languages such as English, making it a natural tool
for processing the text of statutes, regulations, judicial decisions,
contracts, and other legal instruments. Paradoxically, although
state-of-the-art Machine Learning and NLP algorithms are able to
learn and act upon patterns too complex for humans to perceive,
they nevertheless perform poorly on many cognitive tasks that hu-
mans routinely perform effortlessly. This profoundly limits the
ability of Al to assist in many forms of legal analysis and legal de-
cision making.
This article offers two theses. First, notwithstanding impressive
progress on NLP tasks in recent years, the state-of-the-art in NLP
will remain unable to perform legal analysis for some time. Second,
lawyers, legal scholars, and other domain experts can play an inte-
gral role in designing Al software that can partially automate legal
analysis, overcoming some of the limitations in NLP capabilities.
* Dean Alderucci is the Director of Research for the Center for Al & Patent Analysis
at Carnegie Mellon University. He was previously Chief IP counsel for a global financial
services firm, and before that he was Chief Counsel for a business incubator. New York
University School of Law, LL.M.; Columbia University, M.S. in Computer Science; Columbia
University, M.S. in Operations Research.
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INTRODUCTION
As Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning continue to
transform numerous aspects of our everyday lives, their role in the
legal profession is growing in prominence. Al can be used for tasks
such as locating relevant documents in discovery and predicting the
outcome of pending litigation. Al also has the potential to assist in
legal analysis by helping the legal expert assess the consequences
of applying relevant law to a particular fact pattern. Software ca-
pable of performing thorough legal analysis could provide numer-
ous benefits to lawyers, legal scholars, judges, and others in the le-
gal field. Such software could, for example, evaluate hundreds of
contracts for particular weaknesses, generate a concise summary of
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a set of cases, answer questions about whether a particular fact pat-
tern would violate a law, and accurately find cases that support or
contradict a legal position.
A subfield of Al with particular applicability to legal analysis is
Natural Language Processing (NLP). NLP deals with computa-
tional techniques for processing human languages such as English,
making it a natural tool for processing the text of statutes, regula-
tions, judicial decisions, contracts, and other legal instruments.
Paradoxically, although state-of-the-art Machine Learning and
NLP algorithms are able to learn and act upon patterns too complex
for humans to perceive, they nevertheless perform poorly on many
cognitive tasks that humans routinely perform effortlessly. This
profoundly limits the ability of Al to assist in many forms of legal
analysis and legal decision making.
This article offers two theses. First, notwithstanding impressive
progress on NLP tasks in recent years, the state-of-the-art in NLP
will remain unable to perform legal analysis for some time. Second,
lawyers, legal scholars, and other domain experts can play an inte-
gral role in designing Al software that can partially automate legal
analysis, overcoming some of the limitations in NLP capabilities.
This article provides a detailed but accessible explanation of the
limitations of Al in legal analysis, as well as a path for overcoming
these limitations. Part I briefly introduces Machine Learning and
NLP techniques for a lay audience. This Part also explains common
NLP "shortcuts" that have allowed Al software to make seemingly-
intelligent analyses of text without actually performing anything
we might consider to be understanding or reasoning. Unfortu-
nately, these shortcuts do not scale well to the kinds of inferences
and tasks that legal analysis requires. The usual candidates for
improved Machine Learning performance, more training data and
faster computers, also cannot help with these shortcomings.
Part II provides a non-technical explanation of why exactly many
legal analysis tasks exceed the capabilities of the state of the art in
Al. In summary, the most prominent Machine Learning and NLP
algorithms cannot penetrate many types of "common sense" reason-
ing that are essential to the vast majority of legal analysis tasks.
Moreover, such reasoning often relies on underlying knowledge that
is not present in the text being processed and not otherwise acces-
sible to the computer. This type of reasoning is especially promi-
nent in various legal domains, making analysis in those areas diffi-
cult to automate with Al technology.
Nevertheless, understanding the capabilities and shortcomings
of NLP illuminates a way to improve Al systems for legal analysis.
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As described in Part III, the typical legal analysis task is composed
of "subsidiary tasks," such as identifying the elements of a legal is-
sue, evaluating potentially relevant facts and other pieces of infor-
mation, and drawing simple inferences from those facts. The na-
ture of the subsidiary tasks depends on the legal questions at issue.
For example, determining whether a contract has formed involves
different subsidiary tasks than determining whether the elements
of a case of negligence are present.
Such subsidiary tasks are simpler than the complete legal analy-
sis and can be feasible for Al processing, thereby allowing the pro-
cess of legal analysis to be partially automated. Al software that
processed subsidiary tasks would assist a human decision maker in
more quickly locating relevant information and making legal deter-
minations than if the human were to work unaided. The human
would then remain responsible for combining the results of the sub-
sidiary tasks in an appropriate manner to form the legal conclusion.
This might involve weighing all factors of some analysis under a
totality of the circumstances or some other manner of combining
that relies on significant human judgment and cognition.
Moreover, this proposal requires that lawyers and other legal ex-
perts be part of the design of the Al software; only people with the
requisite domain knowledge can identify the subsidiary tasks and
potentially relevant information for a particular type of legal anal-
ysis, as well as define how exactly that information might be ex-
tracted from the text of documents. This shows that lawyers are a
critical part of the solution, and lawyers with basic knowledge of Al
and NLP systems can make significant contributions to his area.
Al software that performs subsidiary tasks for a legal analysis
has additional potential beyond assisting the legal decision maker.
By identifying information that is potentially relevant to a particu-
lar legal analysis task, the Al software is essentially identifying
training data. Specifically, the potentially relevant information are
inputs, and the legal decision ultimately rendered is the desired
output for those inputs. A collection of inputs and corresponding
desired outputs defines training data to teach software what out-
puts to produce for given inputs. Superior NLP systems might
eventually use this training data to learn to perform decision mak-
ing that more closely approximates the legal analysis performed by
humans. When the legal expert identifies subsidiary tasks for a
particular type of legal analysis, the expert is providing information
on how to divide a complex legal reasoning task into tractable steps.
In essence, the human instructs the Al software how to perform
portions of the legal reasoning task.
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Finally, Part IV outlines the proposed method by which legal ex-
perts and NLP system designers can collaborate to design Al soft-
ware that can partially automate different types of legal analysis.
Part IV also provides illustrative examples of this process for a legal
analysis task in the field of patent law. This includes corresponding
subsidiary tasks that Al software can perform to assist in patent-
specific forms of legal analysis. The patent field is especially appro-
priate for this type of NLP-assisted legal analysis because much of
patent analysis involves interpreting the text of the patent itself.
Therefore, software can extract a significant amount of the infor-
mation required in patent analysis from a readily-available docu-
ment. Moreover, drafting techniques of attorneys who write pa-
tents can be reverse engineered to better extract from patents in-
formation that is useful to different types of legal analysis.
I. Al, MACHINE LEARNING, AND NLP
A. Al Fundamentals
Al involves computer software that appears to behave with hu-
man intelligence.1 Machine Learning is the subfield of Al in which
software employs statistical analysis of data to learn how to per-
form a task, such as categorizing a document or predicting the out-
come of pending litigation.2 A common method of developing Ma-
chine Learning systems involves providing the software with veri-
fied examples of some phenomenon, such as a set of emails that a
human has classified as span.3 The software analyzes these exam-
ples to learn their characteristics and thereby learns to predict
when a future example (e.g., a new email message) shares these
characteristics.4 In other words, the software learns from numer-
ous examples, known as "training data" or a "training set," how to
distinguish spain from non-spain emails.5 In this manner, Machine
Learning is an inductive technique; the software develops a model
of the world induced from observation, rather than from general
rules.6
1. Kevin D. Ashley, Automatically Extracting Meaning from Legal Texts: Opportunities
and Challenges, 35 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1117, 1117 (2019).
2. Id. at 1118; see also Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV.
87, 89 (2014) (explaining that Machine Learning systems "are able to learn from experience
and thus improve their performance over time").
3. Surden, supra note 2, at 93.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 91 n.21.
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This Machine Learning approach, known as "supervised learn-
ing," is in contrast to a manual approach in which a programmer
specifies a set of rules that instruct the computer exactly how to
recognize the pattern of interest (e.g., which features of a new email
suggest that it is probably spam).7 In general, the more complex
the problem the more training data is required for the software to
learn the necessary patterns.8 Machine Learning is the backbone
of the technology used in impressive advancements such as self-
driving cars9 and facial recognition10 systems.
Natural Language Processing (NLP) is a subfield of Artificial In-
telligence that overlaps significantly with Machine Learning. NLP
deals with computer processing and manipulating of "natural" lan-
guages, such as English or Spanish." NLP can involve spoken lan-
guage (speech) or written language (text). This article primarily
deals with the latter since text is arguably more significant to the
practice of law than speech; statutes, case law, briefs, contracts, and
other important legal documents are composed of text, so text en-
codes a substantial amount of the information that is relevant to
law and legal practice.
Among the different subfields of Artificial Intelligence, a defining
characteristic of NLP is the use of some knowledge of the natural
language being processed.12 That knowledge can be deeply pro-
found or extremely shallow, so this definition admits many very
simple programs into the universe of NLP. For example, merely
counting the words in a document can be considered an NLP task
because that requires knowledge of what a word is. 13 In English it
is relatively simple to identify a word as a sequence of alphabetic
characters ending with a boundary character such as a space or
punctuation mark. 
14
7. Id. at 93.
8. See, e.g., Xiangxin Zhu et al., Do We Need More Training Data?, 119 INT'L J.
COMPUTER VISION 1 (2015); Alon Halevy et al., The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Data, IEEE
INTELLIGENT SYS., March/April 2009, at 8, 8-12 (2009).
9. See generally Brandon W. Jackson, Artificial Intelligence and the Fog of Innovation:
A Deep-Dive on Governance and the Liability ofAutonomous Systems, 35 SANTA CLARA HIGH
TECH. L.J. 35 (2019); Harry Surden & Mary-Anne Williams, Technological Opacity, Predict-
ability, and Self-Driving Cars, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 121 (2016).
10. See generally Sharon Nakar & Dov Greenbaum, Now You See Me. Now You Still Do:
Facial Recognition Technology and the Growing Lack of Privacy, 23 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L.
88 (2017).




14. Id. It is somewhat more difficult to identify English word boundaries. For example,
'rock 'n roll" can be considered a single word, even though it contains spaces as well as non-
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NLP techniques form the backbone of a wide variety of available
products including virtual assistants, such as Apple's Siri, that are
programmed to understand simple commands spoken by the user.15
NLP decodes the user's speech, which might instruct the virtual as-
sistant to set a timer or play particular music. 16 If the user requests
an answer to a query then NLP enables the virtual assistant o gen-
erate a spoken answer.
17
Text contains information that human readers typically identify
and interpret with ease. Text is a type of "unstructured" data be-
cause text is not clearly arranged for interpretation by a computer.
18
This is in contrast to data that is "structured" because it contains
information in well-specified locations defined by some predeter-
mined organizational scheme.19 For example, a spreadsheet of cli-
ent names, addresses, and amounts owed is structured because one
can easily translate a desired type of information, such as the
amount owed by a client named "Jane Smith," into an exact location
where that information can be found. In reality, there can be dif-
ferent degrees of structure in data, and even the text of natural lan-
guage exhibits some structure imposed by grammar and explicit in-
dicia such as section headings.20 Indeed, NLP techniques can some-
times exploit aspects of this linguistic structure to extract infor-
mation that is buried within the text.
B. NLP Shortcuts that Approximate Reasoning
Al software cannot understand legal texts at a human level of
performance.21 Nevertheless, some NLP techniques can provide im-
pressive results without utilizing anything at all like the compre-
hension and reasoning that a human might perform. Using what
Harry Surden has called "approximating intelligence by proxy,"22
software can mimic the decisions that would have been produced by
alphabetic characters. Id. at 24. In languages such as Chinese, Japanese, and Thai it is even
more difficult to define the boundaries of words. Id. at 25.
15. See, e.g., Peng Lai Li, Natural Language Processing, 1 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 98, 103
(2016).
16. Robert D. Lang & Lenore E. Benessere, Alexa, Siri, Bixby, Google's Assistant, and
Cortana Testifying in Court, 74 J. MO. B. 20, 20-21 (2018).
17. Id.
18. CHRISTOPHER D. MANNING ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INFORMATION RETRIEVAL 1
(2009).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1-2.
21. Ashley, supra note 1, at 1120.
22. Surden, supra note 2, at 97-98 (explaining that non-cognitive software can produce
seemingly intelligent results on complex tasks even though the software does not use human-
level cognition).
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a human who employs high-level human cognitive processes. Two
very common approximation techniques in NLP are "statistical
techniques" and "selectional restrictions," both of which are de-
scribed immediately below.
Statistical techniques lie at the heart of machine learning and
other data-driven algorithms and have been responsible for the suc-
cesses of the last several decades in such NLP tasks as automatic
document summarization and automated question-answering.23 In
the realm of NLP, one statistical technique is to determine which
words tend to occur together in the same sentence, in the same doc-
ument, or within some predefined number of words of each other.24
For example, software could analyze a set of documents to deter-
mine that the words "apple" and "peel" appear together in sentences
much more often than the words "apple" and "digitize" do. This
simple counting process allows the software to determine correla-
tions among pairs of words. It is trivial for software to process thou-
sands of documents and count word co-occurrences for all words in
those documents. Publicly available general-purpose datasets,
such as the Wikitext-103 corpus25 (over 100 million words) and the
One Billion Word Benchmark,2 provide access to copious amounts
of training data for various NLP applications. In the legal domain,
the Caselaw Access Project provides access to all official, book-pub-
lished United States case law, starting from 1658.27 This corpus
includes about 12 billion words from over 6 million United States
legal cases.
28
It is important to note that software can easily calculate how of-
ten pairs of words co-occur without having any knowledge whatso-
ever of the meaning of any of those words, much less the meaning
of a complete sentence formed by a sequence of words. A manual
analogy of the co-occurrence process would be a human reading a
document in a language she does not understand and recording how
23. Hector J. Levesque et al., The Winograd Schema Challenge, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
THIRTEENTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRINCIPLES OF KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION
AND REASONING 552, 558 (Gerhard Brewka et al. eds., 2012).
24. JURAFSKY &MARTIN, supra note 11, at 110.
25. Jeremy Howard & Sebastian Ruder, Universal Language Model Fine-Tuning for Text
Classification, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 56TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR
COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS 328, 330 (Iryna Gurevych & Yusuke Miyao eds., 2018).
26. Ciprian Chelba et al., One Billion Word Benchmark for Measuring Progress in Sta-
tistical Language Modeling, in 1 FIFTEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
SPEECH COMMUNICATION ASSOCIATION 2635-39 (H. Li & P. Ching eds., 2014).
27. About, CASELAW ACCESS PROJECT, https://ease.law/about/ (last visited June 30,
2019).




often each possible pair of words occurs together in the same sen-
tence.29 No comprehension at all is needed for this tedious but
straightforward counting task. Even more advanced corpus linguis-
tics statistical techniques allow the meanings of words to be sug-
gested by the words with which they co-occur.
30
Although the software does not understand any of the words it
processes, calculating word co-occurrences permits NLP software to
perform feats of apparent text comprehension. For example, imag-
ine that NLP software has processed billions of words from Wikipe-
dia pages in order to calculate co-occurrence for every possible pair
of words in the English language. Upon completing these calcula-
tions, the NLP software is tasked with answering the following
question: "The lions ate the zebras because they are predators. What
does 'they' refer to: the lions or the zebras ?"
Answering the question requires that the pronoun "they" be re-
solved, that is, connected to either the word "lions" or the word "zeb-
ras." The human reader answers this question by comprehending
the text and employing simple reasoning about the nature of the
two types of animals or at least using knowledge that predators typ-
ically do the eating. The software can take a much simpler ap-
proach that does not rely on reasoning or knowledge of predators.
Armed with statistics on word co-occurrences, the NLP software can
resolve the pronoun "they" to "lions" because the word "lion" occurs
more frequently with the word "predator" than does the word
"zebra."31 Similarly, the same word co-occurrence data can allow
the NLP software to answer a question such as "Which animal is a
predator: a lion or a zebra?" Although this is more akin to an edu-
cated guess than a reasoned conclusion, it is a surprisingly effective
NLP technique.
Beyond simple word co-occurrence data, more sophisticated sta-
tistical techniques can use additional information on the words that
appear in sentences. For example, a general technique known as
29. As a starker example that no understanding is required in calculating word co-occur-
rences, every occurrence in a set of documents of a particular English word could be ex-
changed with a corresponding nonsense word. For example, every occurrence of "apple" in a
document could be exchanged with "abcde," and every occurrence of"peel" could be exchanged
with "vwxyz." The number of times that "apple" and "peel" co-occur is the same as the num-
ber of times that "abcde" and "vwxyz" co-occur. Therefore, the NLP software could still cal-
culate the number of times that "abcde" and "vwxyz" co-occur.
30. See generally Stefan Th. Gries & Brian G. Slocum, Ordinary Meaning and Corpus
Linguistics, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1417 (2017).
31. Altaf Rahman & Vincent Ng, Resolving Complex Cases of Definite Pronouns: The
Winograd Schema Challenge, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2012 JOINT CONFERENCE ON
EMPIRICAL METHODS IN NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING AND COMPUTATIONAL NATURAL
LANGUAGE LEARNING 777, 781 (Jun'ichi Tsujii et al. eds., 2012).
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language modeling considers the order of words in a sentence in
predicting the next word that might likely follow. Neural language
models can use all words in a sentence or set of sentences to predict
the sequences of words that likely precede or follow a word.32 Lan-
guage modeling significantly increases the power of NLP systems
to process text, albeit without endowing the software with any un-
derstanding of that text whatsoever.
The second type of NLP shortcut, "selectional restrictions," uses
a constraint on the type of word that can be used in certain situa-
tions, often as a constraint on what type of word can be the subject
or object of a particular verb.33 For example, consider the following
statement and question: "Our graduate students published 20 pa-
pers this year and, apparently, a few of them authored some books.
What does 'them' refer to: the graduate students or the papers?'3
4
The pronoun "them" stands in for the subject of the verb "au-
thored," and only people (and perhaps some Al software)35 can au-
thor content. Therefore, the pronoun "them" should resolve to
"graduate students," a type of person, rather than "papers," which
are not a type of person. NLP software can properly understand
that the pronoun "them" refers to "graduate students," if it knows
that (1) only people can author, (2) graduate students are people,
and (3) papers are not people. Of these three pieces of information,
the first involves a common-sense relationship between the verb
"author" and the subject of that verb, i.e., the subject of the verb
"author" must be a type of person. The second and third involve
"type-of' relationships between nouns: a student is a type of person,
and a paper is not a type of person. Two online databases, WordNet
and FrameNet, provide information on exactly these three relation-
ships, allowing NLP software to utilize information on these rela-
tionships.
WordNet is a manually-constructed online database that links
words and conceptual relations.3 WordNet entries store "type-of'
32. YOAV GOLDBERG, NEURAL NETWORK METHODS FOR NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING
109-12 (Graeme Hirst ed., 2017).
33. JURAFSKY & MARTIN, supra note 11, at 368.
34. WALID S. SABA, ON THE WINOGRAD SCHEMA: SITUATING LANGUAGE UNDERSTANDING
IN THE DATA-INFORMATION-KNOWLEDGE CONTINUUM (2019), https://arxiv.org/abs/
1810.00324.
35. See, e.g., Russ Pearlman, Recognizing Artificial Intelligence (AI) as Authors and In-
ventors Under U.S. Intellectual Property Law, 24 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2, 3 (2018) (arguing for
recognition of Al authorship and inventorship); Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rem-
brandt: Artificial Intelligence, Copyright, and Accountability in the 3A Era-The Human-
Like Authors Are Already Here A New Model, 2017 MICH. ST. L. REV. 659, 660 (2017) (ad-
dressing the copyrightability of works generated by Al systems).
36. JURAFSKY & MARTIN, supra note 11, at 493; Christiane Fellbaum, WordNet(s), in 13
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LANGUAGE AND LINGUISTICS 665, 665 (Ron Asher ed., 2006).
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relationships for thousands of words. For example, WordNet de-
fines the word "hamburger" as a type of "sandwich," which in turn
is defined as a type of food."37 This hierarchical information can
then be used in applying restrictions on which nouns may serve as
the subject or object of particular verbs. Those restrictions are cap-
tured in the online FrameNet database.38 For example, the Frame-
Net entry for "eat" explains that the subject of "eat" must be a per-
son and the object must be a type of food.
Selectional restrictions capture aspects of knowledge in a way
that purely statistical techniques do not. This knowledge has been
meticulously sourced from human efforts over many years. When
people manually created the entries in the WordNet and FrameNet
databases, they reduced to digital form significant real-world con-
cepts and how English words relate to those concepts. NLP pro-
grams can benefit from such codified knowledge, typically by deter-
mining whether nouns associated with a particular verb are of the
correct type for that verb.
Both statistical techniques and selectional restrictions allow im-
pressive performance on text processing challenges, masking the
software's lack of text understanding. However, this shortcoming
is revealed on more challenging tasks that require the software to
possess some form of language understanding.
II. LIMITATIONS OF Al IN COMMON SENSE REASONING
In light of NLP's impressive successes, it is somewhat surprising
that even state-of-the-art algorithms struggle with tasks that could
reasonably be considered simple, or even trivial, for humans to per-
form. These deceptively-challenging tasks fall under the rubric of
common sense reasoning," a term that encompasses different types
of cognitive skills and real-world knowledge. Software that cannot
perform simple reasoning would be extremely unlikely to perform
more complex legal reasoning tasks, which often rely upon simple
reasoning and knowledge about the world.
Since NLP shortcuts can endow software with the appearance of
human-level understanding, researchers have explored tests to dis-
tinguish software that truly understands the meaning of text from
software that merely mimics such understanding. Below, I describe
37. JURAFSKY & MARTIN, supra note 11, at 369-70.
38. See generally JURAFSKY & MARTIN, supra note 11, at 362; Collin F. Baker et al., The
Berkeley FrameNet Project, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 17TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS 86 (1998).
Vol. 58
The Automation of Legal Reasoning
the Winograd Schema Challenge, problems which have been specif-
ically designed so that they cannot be solved by merely using NLP
shortcuts like statistical techniques or selectional restrictions. Suc-
cessfully solving these problems is believed to require at least rudi-
mentary commonsense reasoning by the NLP system.
Software that exhibits common sense reasoning at the level of a
human is a formidable problem. Software that could do so would
likely pass or come close to passing the Turing Test,39 a touchstone
for determining whether a computer is able to behave as intelli-
gently as a human.40 In the Turing Test, software engages in an
extended conversation via teleprinter with a human, who does not
know whether she is conversing with a human or machine.41 If the
human is fooled into believing the machine is another human, then
the machine has passed the Turing Test and can be considered to
be thinking to some extent.
Unfortunately, neither statistics nor selectional restrictions
alone can be extended to handle even simple tasks of commonsense
reasoning. In short, neither shortcut involves anything we might
consider to be "reasoning" about the real world, nor do they encap-
sulate the types of real-world knowledge possessed by humans, in-
cluding small children. Because these limitations are inherent to
the techniques themselves, they are unlikely to be overcome with
additional training data or much faster computers, two staples of
increased Machine Learning performance in recent years.
Some simple examples will illustrate common sense reasoning
and how software fails on such tasks. Consider the following ques-
tion. "The trophy doesn't fit in the brown suitcase because it is too
small. What does it' refer to: trophy or suitcase?" A human has no
difficulty recognizing that the pronoun must refer to "suitcase."
This conclusion is based on simple spatial reasoning.42 If the suit-
case is smaller than the trophy then the trophy cannot fit in the
suitcase, but if the trophy is smaller than the suitcase there would
be no problem fitting the trophy in the suitcase.
Statistical analysis does not provide an easy way to answer this
question. There is no reason to believe that either of the words "tro-
phy" or "suitcase" would co-occur with "small" more frequently than
39. See generally A.M. Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 59 MIND 433
(1950).
40. See id. at 459-60.
41. See id.
42. See Ernest Davis, Qualitative Spatial Reasoning in Interpreting Text and Narrative,
13 SPATIAL COGNITION & COMPUTATION 264, 264 (2013) (demonstrating that very simple nat-
ural language texts can "raise problems in commonsense spatial knowledge and reasoning of
surprising logical complexity and geometric richness").
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the other word. Selectional restrictions are also unavailing because
both a trophy and a suitcase are the kinds of things that can be
referred to as "too small."
The above trophy-suitcase question is selected from the Winograd
Schema Challenge.43 The Winograd Schema Challenge is "designed
so that the correct answer is obvious to the human reader, but can-
not easily be found using selectional restrictions or statistical tech-
niques over text corpora."44 To discourage the use of NLP shortcuts
that do not require text understanding, Winograd Schema problems
are arranged in pairs, each differing by only a single word. This
small change results in a question with the opposite answer. For
example, these two questions differ in only the underlined words:
"The trophy doesn't fit in the brown suitcase because it is too
small. What does 'it' refer to?"
"The trophy doesn't fit in the brown suitcase because it is too bid.
What does it' refer to?"
The answer to the first is "suitcase" while the answer to the sec-
ond is "trophy." The pairing of problems in this manner, each al-
most identical but requiring opposite answers, negates NLP
shortcuts that might use the word order or other clever features of
the remaining words in the problem as a hint to the proper answer.
In other words, the problems are designed so that the other (un-
changing) words in the problem pair do not provide any statistical
clues to the correct answer. If they did, they would provide the
same clue for both problems, which have opposite answers; use of
statistical clues would guarantee that one of the pair is answered
incorrectly.
The trophy-suitcase problem requires commonsense spatial rea-
soning. There are many other types of commonsense reasoning. In-
deed, humans perform commonsense reasoning so easily that it can
be difficult to identify exactly what kinds of knowledge and infer-
ences are involved in answering a question. The designers of the
Winograd Schema Challenge believe that software that successfully
answers the majority of the questions "will need to have com-
monsense knowledge about space, time, physical reasoning, emo-
tions, social constructs, and a wide variety of other domains."45 As
an example of commonsense reasoning about cause and effect, also
43. See Levesque et al., supra note 23, at 554; see also Ernest Davis, Collection of Wino-
grad Schemas, NYU COURANT COMPUTER Sci., https://es.nyu.edu/faculty/davise/Papers/
WinogradSchemas/WSCollection.html ( ast visited June 28, 2019).
44. Levesque et al., supra note 23, at 552.
45. Id. at 558.
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known as causal implication, consider the following Winograd
Schema problem pair.
4
"Anna did a lot better than her good friend Lucy on the test be-
cause she had studied so hard. Who studied hard?"
"Anna did a lot worse than her good friend Lucy on the test be-
cause she had studied so hard. Who studied hard?"
The answer to the first is Anna, and the answer to the second is
Lucy. This problem pair requires an understanding of the most
likely effect of studying hard, which, in turn, requires an under-
standing of the nature of tests, studying, and the relationship be-
tween studying and test performance.
The next problem pair requires knowledge of other basic real-
world relationships.
"Sam broke both his ankles and he's walking with crutches. But
a month or so from now they should be better. What should be bet-
ter?"
"Sam broke both his ankles and he's walking with crutches. But
a month or so from now they should be unnecessary. What should
be unnecessary?"
Understanding that the first answer is "ankles" and the second
is "crutches" requires understanding rudimentary details about in-
juries, healing, and why people use crutches. This knowledge is the
kind acquired through ordinary human interactions. The next
problem draws upon knowledge of human social interactions.
"Joan made sure to thank Susan for all the help she had given.
Who had given help?"
"Joan made sure to thank Susan for all the help she had received.
Who had received help?"
To conclude that the first answer is "Susan" and the second is
"Joan" requires that the software understand basic social aspects of
gratitude and the general reasons that people express thanks.
The Winograd Schema questions are extremely simple and many
could be answered by children.47 Moreover, the Winograd Schema
Challenge evaluates commonsense reasoning by employing an ex-
tremely narrow problem: resolving referential ambiguity, that is,
deciding which noun a pronoun or possessive adjective refers to.
48
This problem is a limited test of common sense reasoning; only a
46. See generally Melissa Roemmele et al., Choice of Plausible Alternatives: An Evalua-
tion of Commonsense Causal Reasoning, in AAAI SPRING SYMPOSIUM ON LOGICAL
FORMALIZATIONS OF COMMONSENSE R ASONING 21 (Ernest Davis et al. eds., 2011).
47. See Davis, supra note 43. Of the 150 problem pairs listed, many require only ex-
tremely basic real-world knowledge gained from routine human interactions.
48. Levesque et al., supra note 23, at 557.
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single pronoun is to be resolved, and the noun to which the pronoun
refers is known to exist in a single sentence. In contrast, it is fairly
common for text to have more complicated structures in which in-
formation from multiple sentences must be aggregated to make an
inference. It is also not uncommon that the referent of a pronoun
is not present in a previous sentence but is instead implicit. In
other words, the Winograd Schema Challenge appears to be a fair
test of commonsense reasoning and certainly is not an unfairly chal-
lenging one.
People outside the field of Al can be forgiven for wondering what
all the fuss is about. Is it really the case that software with access
to billions of words and millions of web pages nevertheless cannot
perform well at answering commonsense reasoning questions? Af-
ter all, most people could solve the Winograd Schema problems eas-
ily and without thinking, in many cases exhibiting only the level of
reasoning mastered by children in elementary school. Surely soft-
ware can do so as well.
Unfortunately, software is not up to this task. The Winograd
Schema Challenge was held at the 25th International Joint Confer-
ence on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-16) on July 2016. None of the
NLP systems entered by contestants were able to advance from the
first round to the second round.49 The highest scoring entry an-
swered less than half of all questions correctly.50 These lackluster
results on simple questions may be surprising, especially given the
performance of NLP systems on seemingly harder tasks. For exam-
ple, in 2011, IBM's Watson system answered "Jeopardy!" questions
49. Ernest Davis et al., The First Winograd Schema Challenge at IJCAI-16, AI MAG., Fall
2017, at 97, 97.
50. Id. at 98 tbl.1. However, in a paper released on June 19, 2019, Carnegie Mellon
University and Google Brain researchers achieved 90.4% accuracy on WNLI, a modified ver-
sion of the Winograd Schema Challenge. ZHILIN YANG ET AL., XLNET: GENERALIZED
AUTOREGRESSIVE PRETRAINING FOR LANGUAGE UNDERSTANDING tbl.4 (2020), https://
arxiv.org/abs/1906.08237. Their paper was released just days before the submission of this
article and before publication of any subsequent analysis of the researchers' results. How-
ever, researchers have hypothesized that Machine Learning models that perform inordi-
nately well on analogous reasoning challenges rely on the questions containing subtle "spu-
rious statistical cues" to the proper answer. TIMOTHY NIVEN & HUNG-YU KAO, PROBING
NEURAL NETWORK COMPREHENSION OF NATURAL LANGUAGE ARGUMENTS (2019),
https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.07355; see also Abhijit Mahabal, Do NLP Entailment Benchmarks
Measure Faithfully?, MEDIUM (July 19, 2019), https://towardsdatascience.com/do-nlp-entail-
ment-benchmarks-measure-faithfully-e600212692b3. It is possible that some or all of
XLNet's performance on the WNLI task comes from exploiting statistical clues in the data
and not from the application of deep understanding of the real-world or common sense rea-
soning.
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better than human champions of the game.51 However, as ex-
plained above, NLP shortcuts can solve some types of natural lan-
guage problems without requiring that the software understand an-
ything about the text or the real world.52 Researchers have noted
that commonsense knowledge and reasoning played a limited role
in Watson's success.53 Among other strategies, Watson made use of
words and noun phrases in the questions that specify the type of
the answer "without any attempt to understand its semantics."
54
A common thread among different flavors of commonsense rea-
soning is the need to draw upon different forms of "background
knowledge": information that is not explicit in the text being pro-
cessed. For example, solving the trophy-suitcase problem requires
knowledge of spatial reasoning and how the size of objects has im-
plications for fitting one inside of the other. Nothing in the prob-
lem's single sentence contains this information. Likewise, even if
that single sentence was present in a more extensive document it is
unlikely that any part of the document would contain an explana-
tion of the requisite spatial reasoning information. Not only does
unstated background knowledge help with understanding text, the
answer to questions asked about text may actually be a word or
phrase not present in the sentence or document. For example, the
following question is similar to a Winograd Schema problem be-
cause it asks which noun the pronoun "it" refers to. However, it has
a crucial difference that, although small, makes it inappropriate for
the Winograd Schema Challenge.
'Dave told everyone in school that he wants to be a guitarist be-
cause he thinks it is a great sounding instrument. What does 'it'
refer to?"
51. See Betsy Cooper, Judges in Jeopardy!: Could IBM's Watson Beat Courts at Their
Own Game?, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 87, 87 (2011) (describing how IBM's Watson system beat
the world's top "Jeopardy!" Champions); David Ferrucci et al., Building Watson: An Overview
of the DeepQA Project, Al MAG., Fall 2010, at 59, 59.
52. See Davis, supra note 42, at 291 (explaining that the "many successes of applications
of corpus-based [Machine Learning] to natural language text are very explicitly based on the
avoidance of the kind of [common sense] inferences discussed here"); see also Ernest Davis &
Gary Marcus, Commonsense Reasoning and Commonsense Knowledge in Artificial Intelli-
gence, COMM. ACM, Sept. 2015, at 92, 94 ('Almost without exception, current computer pro-
grams to carry out language tasks succeed to the extent the tasks can be carried out purely
in terms of manipulating individual words or short phrases, without attempting any deeper
understanding; commonsense is evaded. .. ").
53. A. Kalyanpur et al., Structured Data and Inference in DeepQA, 56 IBM J. RES. & DEV.
1 (2012); see also Davis & Marcus, supra note 52, at 94 ("The key techniques in Watson are
mostly of the same flavor as those used in programs like Web search engines .... There is
no evidence that Watson is anything like a general-purpose solution to the commonsense
problem.").
54. Ferrucci et al., supra note 51, at 70.
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Here "it" must refer to "guitar," a noun not mentioned in the
text.55 Clearly "it" cannot refer to any of the other nouns in the
sentence because "it" must be a type of "instrument" and none of
the other nouns are instruments. In the context of the sentence the
implication is obvious, provided we possess the background
knowledge that a guitarist plays a guitar. The ability to access un-
stated background knowledge is used to solve a wider array of prob-
lems besides understanding what a pronoun refers to.56
This simple example presents difficulties for common Machine
Learning techniques, which generally rely exclusively on processing
massive amounts of text data but do not attempt to codify and rep-
resent real-world background knowledge.57 Such techniques will
fail to recognize concepts that humans implicitly assume "due to our
shared background knowledge of the world and the way we talk
about it in ordinary spoken language."58 In essence, purely data-
driven Machine Learning techniques "cannot model what is not
there."5
9
In summary, commonsense reasoning has largely remained im-
pervious to the most powerful Machine Learning and NLP tech-
niques. Solving most commonsense reasoning problems via soft-
ware seems to require that the software have access to a large re-
pository of the background knowledge most people possess but take
for granted. There is no accepted method for creating or organizing
such a repository of background knowledge.0
In Part III, below, this article explores legal analysis. In partic-
ular, this article explain how legal analysis typically involves back-
ground knowledge that is not disclosed in the text being processed,
as well as other aspects of commonsense reasoning that continue to
stymie NLP software. This characteristic of legal analysis suggests
55. WALID S. SABA, Is THERE A'SIMPLE' MACHINE LEARNING METHOD FOR COMMONSENSE
REASONING?: A SHORT COMMENTARY ON TRINH & LE (2018), https://arxiv.org/abs/1810.00521.
56. SABA, supra note 34.
57. SABA, supra note 55. Saba provides evidence that the NLP technique proposed by
Trinh & Le, and more broadly any other data-driven technique, "will not scale into a workable
and reasonable solution" because "data-driven approaches, true to their name, can only make
generalizations based on the data they process," but not background knowledge the text does
not describe.
58. Id. (emphasis in original).
59. Id.
60. Adam Richard-Bollans et al., The Role of Pragmatics in Solving the Winograd
Schema Challenge, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTEENTH INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON
COMMONSENSE REASONING (Andrew S. Gordon et al. eds., 2017) (concluding that "it is clear
that the necessary commonsense knowledge [for solving such problems] would involve the
formalization of a notoriously extensive knowledge base. How to obtain and organize such a
large knowledge base is unclear.").
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that there will be limitations in automating legal reasoning with
NLP software.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Legal Analysis: Common Sense and More
Broadly speaking, the goal of legal analysis is to interpret or ap-
ply the law to particular facts. This involves identifying the legal
authority that may apply and the issues in the fact pattern that
may be relevant. It can sometimes be challenging merely to under-
stand which law and legal principles apply to a fact pattern. More-
over, even if the relevant law and facts are certain, the resolution
of the legal question might remain unclear because reasonable ar-
guments can be made for contradictory conclusions.
One might think that the process of legal reasoning would be
straightforward for computers. Once the facts and law are provided
to the computer, the computer would diligently determine which le-
gal conditions are satisfied by the facts and then provide the con-
clusion.6 1 Unfortunately, NLP software that attempts to perform
its own form of legal reasoning would have to contend with several
conspicuous obstacles. The reasoning in judicial decisions may rely
on unstated background knowledge or commonsense reasoning,
which presents serious difficulties for NLP software attempting to
understand the state of the law.62 Compounding this difficulty is
the fact that judges will often explicitly use intuition or a similar
concept in their reasoning,3 even though that intuition can be un-
explainable and without explicit justification. 4 Courts will often
link or even equate judicial intuition with common sense.5
An additional difficulty for NLP software conducting legal rea-
soning lies in determining the specific legal principles that are pre-
sented by a body of case law. The text of a decision does not always
make clear the nature of the legal reasoning involved. The judge's
reasoning can be incomplete because crucial assumptions are not
61. KEVIN D. ASHLEY, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LEGAL ANALYTICS: NEW TOOLS FOR
LAW PRACTICE IN THE DIGITAL AGE 50 (2017).
62. See Part II supra.
63. R. George Wright, The Role of Intuition in Judicial Decisionmaking, 42 HouS. L. REV.
1381, 1385 (2006).
64. Id. at 1386.
65. Id.; see also Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV.
827, 838-41 (1988) (arguing that "practical" reasoning, including common sense and intui-
tion, can answer most of the legal questions that logic cannot answer).
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explicit.3 Indeed, with enough of the legal reasoning lacking, the
decision can appear to be arbitrary. 7
Extracting the state of the law from judicial decisions can be es-
pecially thorny because such law might depend strongly on analog-
ical arguments.8 To understand judicial decisions and how to ap-
ply them, NLP software would need to be capable of drawing appro-
priate analogies between different fact patterns.9 Crucially, legal
reasoning involves identifying which similarities are relevant, not
merely that similarities exist.7 0 Just what makes distinct sets of
facts similar to each other "depends on the principle for which the
initial case is said, on reflection, to stand."71 It would be especially
challenging for software to identify principles because they depend
on "evaluative judgments" that try to tease out whether the princi-
ple would be inconsistent with "anything ... to which the legal sys-
tem has committed itself."72 These principles can depend on moral
and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or uncon-
scious, and even the prejudices of judges.73 In light of all of the
above, it can be difficult even for legal experts to describe precisely
what makes one legal argument stronger than another.
7 4
Unsurprisingly, complete start-to-finish legal analysis by NLP
software is an imposing and, for the moment, infeasible goal. Legal
analysis requires commonsense reasoning, both to understand
which issues arise from a fact pattern as well as to determine which
legal principles should be applicable. Legal analysis also requires
unstated background knowledge about the real world. Some of this
background knowledge may, furthermore, be specific to a domain.
For example, decisions in the field of patent law frequently rely on
66. Richard Warner, Note, Three Theories of Legal Reasoning, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1523,
1523 (1989) (discussing the appearance of arbitrariness in many legal decisions); see also
Kevin D. Ashley & Stefanie Bruninghaus, Computer Models for Legal Prediction, 46
JURIMETRICS J. 309, 315-16 (2006) ("Judges may not have disclosed the features that influ-
enced their decision or stated their ationales accurately or completely.").
67. Warner, supra note 66, at 1523.
68. See generally Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the
Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARv. L. REV. 923, 927 (1996) (providing
a detailed model of the process of reasoning by analogy); Emily Sherwin, A Defense of Ana-
logical Reasoning in Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179 (1999) (arguing that although analogical
reasoning is an unscientific practice with imperfect results, it should be defended on the basis
of its epistemic and institutional advantages).
69. Cass R. Sunstein, Of Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning, 8 U. CHL L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 29, 31 (2001).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 31-32.
72. Id. at 32-33.
73. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Dover Publ'ns 1991) (1881).
74. Brett G. Scharffs, The Character of Legal Reasoning, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 733,
737 (2004).
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the details of a particular field of technology or on the capabilities
of people who practice in a particular field. Given that general com-
monsense reasoning is beyond the capabilities of state-of-the-art
software, the additional burden of utilizing background knowledge
and evaluating principles of case law renders general-purpose legal
analysis by software an impossibility with current technology.
To address this daunting challenge, we begin by noting that the
typical legal analysis task is composed of "subsidiary tasks," such
as evaluating potentially relevant facts and other pieces of infor-
mation and then drawing simple inferences from those facts. Mak-
ing a legal analysis task tractable for partial automation by soft-
ware involves, as a first step, decomposing the task into its subsid-
iary tasks. The subsidiary tasks will naturally depend on the na-
ture of the legal analysis. It will be instructive to attempt to iden-
tify the subsidiary tasks present in the legal analysis task pre-
sented immediately below as well as in Section C of Part IV.
B. Legal Analysis Example: Patent Claim Obviousness
In this section I briefly summarize a core patent law doctrine,
obviousness,75 in order to provide a concrete example of the tasks
performed in conducting a specific type of legal analysis. This ex-
ample will illustrate aspects of legal analysis that are difficult for
software to perform and will suggest a possible solution that allows
properly-designed Al software to partially-automate legal analysis.
It will also illustrate an aspect of the legal analysis that is rife with
common sense reasoning.
Under § 103 of the Patent Act, a claim of a patent is invalid "if
the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are
such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious
... to a person having ordinary skill in the art."7 The goal of the
non-obviousness requirement is to grant patents only for those in-
ventions that represent a sufficiently large advance over previ-
ously-known technology, i.e., over the "prior art."7
7
75. See, e.g., ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND
POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 643 (3d ed. 2007) (introducing the nonobviousness require-
ment as "the most important of the basic patent requirements").
76. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
77. Lee Petherbridge, On the Development of Patent Law, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 893, 907-
08 (2010); see also Sensonics, Inc. v. Aerosonic Corp., 81 F.3d 1566, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(referring to a "significant and unobvious advance over" previous technology).
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Obviousness is a question of law,78 but it relies upon factual in-
quiries including the scope and content of the prior art, the differ-
ences between the prior art and the claims of the patent, and the
level of ordinary skill in the art.79 Additional facts such as commer-
cial success of the invention, long felt but unsolved needs solved by
the invention, and the failure of others to create the invention can
also be relevant to determining whether a patent claim is obvious.
80
The statute requires that obviousness be judged from the per-
spective of the "person of ordinary skill in the art," a theoretical
construct that is not descriptive of any particular individual.81 In
this sense, the person having ordinary skill in the art is "not unlike
the 'reasonable man' and other ghosts in the law."82 This fictitious
person is endowed with all existing information in the prior art.
83
The claims must be invalidated under § 103 of the Patent Act only
if that hypothetical person would find the claimed invention to be
obvious.
A full legal analysis of the obviousness of a patent claim requires
understanding the patent's technology, the state of the art in the
field of that technology, and the differences between the two. Alt-
hough this is a necessary factual assessment, it is not sufficient.
The analysis also mandates an inquiry into what exactly the person
possessing ordinary skill would conclude about the obviousness of
the claimed invention. This analysis must incorporate the scope of
that skilled person's knowledge and technical abilities. These abil-
ities can be assessed by considering factors such as the educational
level of the inventor, the types of problems encountered in the tech-
nical field, prior solutions to those problems, how fast innovations
are made, the sophistication of the technology, and the educational
level of workers in the field.84
This difficult assessment is complicated by the fact that it in-
volves considerations with very ill-defined boundaries. The obvi-
ousness determination must consider the creativity of a person of
ordinary skill in the art.85 Also relevant is that person's common
78. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).
79. Id. at 17.
80. Id. at 17-18.
81. Endress + Hauser, Inc. v. Hawk Measurement Sys. Pty. Ltd., 122 F.3d 1040, 1042
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955,
963 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
82. Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
83. Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 454 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
84. Helifix, Ltd. v. Blok-Lok, Ltd., 208 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Custom
Accessories, Inc., 807 F.2d at 962).
85. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420-21 (2007).
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sense reasoning abilities. 86 This can be especially difficult for data-
driven methods that extract information from legal and other texts
because the extent of creativity and common sense of the authors
may not be reflected within these documents.
87
Understanding the range of abilities possessed by the person of
ordinary skill in the art is central to many patent law doctrines be-
sides obviousness, including enablement88 and indefiniteness
89 of
patent claims. Briefly, the enablement requirement demands that
the patent specification teach persons of ordinary skill in the art
how to make and use the claimed invention without undue experi-
mentation.90 The purpose of the enablement requirement is "to ex-
tract meaningful disclosure of the invention and, by this disclosure,
advance the technical arts."91 Similarly, to satisfy the indefinite-
ness requirement the patent's claims must inform those skilled in
the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.
92
This ensures that the public has clear notice of the exclusionary
rights provided by the patent.93
Like the reasonable person standard present in so many other
areas of the law, assessing the legal contours of the person of ordi-
nary skill intimately involves considerations like common sense
and creativity that lack clear boundaries. As described above in
Part II, common sense reasoning is difficult for state-of-the-art NLP
techniques to carry out. Moreover, legal text that is processed by
NLP software does not explicitly describe much of the knowledge on
which common sense reasoning is based. Therefore, even signifi-
cantly more sophisticated software could not extract this knowledge
from those texts. In summary, some portions of legal reasoning lie
beyond the reach of Al technology and are likely to remain so for
some time. Accepting this limitation can lead to an improved model
for Al systems that assist in legal reasoning tasks, as explained in
Part IV.
86. Id. at 420.
87. Id. at 419; see also Perfect Web Techs., Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 1329
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (explaining that the obviousness inquiry may include "common sense avail-
able to the person of ordinary skill [in the art] that do not necessarily require explication in
any reference or expert opinion").
88. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
89. Id. § 112(b).
90. MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi Glob. Storage Techs., Inc., 687 F.3d 1377, 1380 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
91. Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing
Koito Mfg. Co., Ltd. v. Turn-Key-Tech, LLC, 381 F.3d 1142, 1155 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
92. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 901 (2014).
93. Id. at 909. Clear notice is necessary to avoid a "zone of uncertainty which enterprise
and experimentation may enter only at the risk of infringement claims." Id. at 909-10 (quot-
ing United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942)).
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IV. IMPROVING Al FOR LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Existing Methods of Legal Reasoning by Al
There is a large and growing body of work on computational mod-
els of legal reasoning.94 Ashley defines a computational model of
legal reasoning as "a computer program that implements a process
evidencing attributes of human legal reasoning," which "may in-
volve analyzing a situation and answering a legal question, predict-
ing an outcome, or making a legal argument."95 Ashley distin-
guishes computational models of legal reasoning from legal text an-
alytics, which is defined as the discovery of knowledge from legal
text.96 Informally, the difference is between the reasoning and ob-
taining the information on which reasoning is based. This distinc-
tion is important for the current discussion of Al and legal analysis.
Computational models of legal reasoning, like all forms of legal
reasoning, depend on knowledge such as the state of the law. How-
ever, today's computers cannot extract all required knowledge di-
rectly from legal texts such as cases, statutes, regulations, and con-
tracts. Instead, human experts must read legal texts, extract rele-
vant knowledge in those texts, and manually translate this
knowledge into a form that software can use to perform its legal
reasoning.97 This "knowledge representation bottleneck" prevents
NLP software from performing legal analysis from start to finish
without a significant investment of human labor.
98
Legal text analytics is designed to extract relevant information
from legal texts. For example, software can automatically annotate
legal texts to indicate various concepts and their relations to each
other.99 Software also can process case texts for argument-related
information about the roles of sentences in a case.100 Although the
software can intelligently process argument-related information, it
does not understand those arguments to any profound extent.101
Even if legal text analytics could identify all information it attempts
to locate in legal text, this class of techniques nevertheless misses
94. See generally ASHLEY, supra note 61, at 50-201 (describing the literature on different
computational models for statutory reasoning, case-based legal reasoning, predicting legal
outcomes, and legal argument).
95. Id. at 12.
96. Id. at 13.
97. Id. at 12-13.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 205.
100. Id. at 334.
101. Id. at 441.
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a significant type of information: background knowledge and other
implicit information not stated in the text.
B. A Proposal to Advance Al-Driven Legal Analysis
In summary, two limitations of Machine Learning systems are
particularly relevant to legal analysis: performing common sense
reasoning and incorporating background knowledge that is not ex-
plicit in the text being processed. Both skills are required in legal
analysis, and Al generally performs poorly at both. Therefore, we
should minimize the role of software in both, while at the same time
utilizing software as much as possible in the remaining steps of le-
gal analysis.
The proposal below is founded on the assumption that it is futile
to ask the software to perform the cognitive manipulations of infor-
mation required in commonsense reasoning. However, we can,
among other things, command the software to search for and pre-
sent to the human legal expert the types of information that might
possibly be relevant to the legal analysis being performed. This in
turn requires that the software understand the steps involved in
that legal analysis, what kinds of information are potentially rele-
vant, and how those kinds of information might be expressed in
text. The software will then provide the human with information
that is helpful or indispensable to the legal analysis, though the
human retains ultimate responsibility for drawing the conclusions
that follow from that information.
This computational model of legal reasoning partitions responsi-
bility for legal analysis between the human and the legal expert.
The collaborative activity, known as "cognitive computing," allows
humans and computers to each perform the kinds of intelligent ac-
tivities that they can do best.10 2 This is very much in line with Ash-
ley's observation that although software cannot read legal texts in
the sense that humans read, it can nevertheless intelligently pro-
cess those texts to identify elements that are relevant to a problem
and bring these elements to the user's attention.
10 3
I begin by describing the proposed process for designing an Al
system that is tailored to a specified legal domain. I then expound
on this proposal by outlining a specific example of its usage for the
patent law question of claim definiteness.
The first step in the design process is for the legal expert to select
one or more particular forms of legal analysis in some area of law.
102. Id. at 3.
103. Id. at 22.
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For example, one might decide that the Al system should analyze
whether a valid contract has been formed under Virginia law. It
may be acceptable to select several distinct but related forms of le-
gal analysis if there is sufficient overlap between them.
Next, the legal expert develops an outline of the steps that must
be performed in this legal analysis, including the details and per-
mutations possible for each step. For example, in analyzing
whether a valid contract has been formed, each of the requisite ele-
ments of contract formation must be established. The inquiry for a
single element can be complex so the details of each must be out-
lined. For example, in determining whether conduct and words
would convey to a reasonable person an intent to be bound, the ex-
pert would thoroughly review applicable case law to understand
and outline exactly which kinds of conduct and words do or do not
convey an intent to be bound.10 4 This case law review would reveal
many specific examples that the expert would use in the steps that
follow.
The next step in the proposed process is to identify the infor-
mation that is possibly, though not necessarily, useful to the legal
analysis. Continuing with the contract example, information such
as whether there is a prior arrangement to be bound by subse-
quently-passed rules,105 or whether the agreement had been read
by all parties, 1013 can be relevant to whether an intent to be bound
has been conveyed.
Extracting information from text can be deceptively difficult de-
pending on the complexity of the information and how such infor-
mation might be represented in text form. For example, a single
type of information might be capable of being written using very
different words and phrases. Where the information of interest ex-
ists in legal instruments such as contracts, wills, or patents that are
drafted by an attorney, the experienced attorney can offer signifi-
cant insights. Knowledge of the legal drafting process, and in par-
ticular how the drafter can use different patterns of text to repre-
sent a particular concept, can help in the design of NLP software
that is better able to identify and extract the desired information
from text. It is at this point that the legal expert must collaborate
104. See, e.g., Lucyv. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 522 (Va. 1954); Timothy S. Hall, Magic and
Contract: The Role of Intent, 12 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 464, 466 (2005) (describing Lucy v.
Zehmer as demonstrating the "elementary principle of contracts that the relevant intent is
the objective, expressed intent of the actor").
105. Falls Church v. Protestant Episcopal Church, 740 S.E.2d 530, 540-41 (Va. 2013).
106. Woodson v. Gilmer, 137 S.E.2d 891, 893 (Va. 1964).
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with NLP experts to help understand and then define exactly what
patterns of text can express the desired information.107
The final step of the proposed process is to define the preferred
manner to aggregate and convey the information identified by the
NLP software. For example, for the legal analysis of contract for-
mation the software could aggregate, for each element of formation,
the pieces of information for and against a conclusion that the ele-
ment is satisfied. Such aggregation can also entail drawing simple
inferences from the information. For legal analysis that is per-
formed en masse over several fact patterns, such as in the analysis
of hundreds of contracts, it can be advantageous to calculate scores
for the legal analysis applied to a particular document. For exam-
ple, by counting all evidence in favor of and against some conclusion
(e.g., the contract lacks consideration) and noting for each contract
whether the evidence strongly or weakly favors the conclusion or its
negation, the software could provide a score for each contract or
other document. The software could also quickly identify a subset
of the contracts that are more likely, or less likely, to meet that con-
clusion based on their scores. This en masse scoring allows the de-
cision maker's attention to be quickly focused on documents that
are likely to meet their desired criteria, e.g., contracts that are very
likely or very unlikely to lack consideration.
According to a common recommendation in innovation processes
such as design thinking108 and agile development, 10 9 iteratively de-
veloping the Al system can help to produce a higher quality design
in a shorter amount of time. One should feel free to revisit the ear-
lier stages of the process, such as identifying information, once in-
sights are produced in later stages, such as defining how to aggre-
gate information that is collected.
A noteworthy aspect of this process is that legal analysis is used
to design the Al software, and therefore the entire process is imbued
with significant domain knowledge. Domain knowledge can im-
prove the performance of Al software.110 Machine Learning sys-
tems often do not incorporate domain knowledge, instead being
107. Cf. David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should
Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 717 (2017) (stating that collabo-
ration between lawyers and technologists will be key for tackling some of the most intractable
problems at the juncture of law and Machine Learning).
108. See generally Tim Brown, Design Thinking, HARV. Bus. REV., June 2008, at 84.
109. See generally Daniel E. Schoeni, Long on Rhetoric, Short on Results: Agile Methods
and Cyber Acquisitions in the Department of Defense, 31 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 385
(2015).
110. See, e.g., Vincent Aleven, Using Background Knowledge in Case-Based Legal Reason-
ing: A Computational Model and an Intelligent Learning Environment, 150 ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE 183 (2003) (arguing that it is necessary to represent and apply middle-level
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driven purely by analysis of the raw data devoid of context.111 This
may be because Machine Learning practitioners can have difficulty
understanding or applying domain knowledge.
112
Note also that the proposed design process is somewhat contrary
to the typical Machine Learning paradigm. The purely data-driven
Machine Learning system learns all relevant patterns from being
exposed to numerous examples, rather than by being told what
kinds of patterns are useful or interesting.11 3 In contrast, the pro-
posed process delegates this cognitive task of identifying important
data to the legal expert. Although this imposes a burden on the
human, software would not be able to learn these patterns with suf-
ficient accuracy.
The identification of information that is potentially relevant to
the legal analysis has another benefit beyond bringing important
information to the attention of the user of the NLP software. This
information could be useful in future efforts to train a Machine
Learning system to perform more advanced legal analysis with less
human input than described in this article. Note that in the process
proposed above, potentially-relevant information must first be iden-
tified. Moreover, when the NLP software proposed above is used by
lawyers, the lawyers' evaluations and legal conclusions based on
this information could eventually be captured. Such evaluations
and conclusions could then form a set of training data of inputs (rel-
evant information) and outputs (legal conclusions based on this in-
formation). This training data could be used to teach a future Ma-
chine Learning system to learn how to draw the same sorts of con-
clusions from relevant information.
C. An Example of the Proposed Process: Alfor Patent Indefinite-
ness
In this section, I provide a brief overview of the legal standard for
patent claim indefiniteness. The purpose of this exposition is to
understand not only the analysis that the legal decision maker un-
dertakes but also the types of information that are relevant to the
normative background knowledge in order to address case-based argumentation). The pro-
posal offered in this article is similar to Aleven's in identifying the main issues raised by a
problem. Id. at 193-94. However, Aleven's system, to my knowledge, does not incorporate
the NLP systems for extracting information from text as proposed here.
111. Ting Yu et al., Incorporating Prior Domain Knowledge into Inductive Machine Learn-
ing, 73 NEUROCOMPUTING 2614, 2614 (2010).
112. Id.
113. Surden, supra note 2, at 90-93.
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analysis. Both will be used in designing Al software to partially
automate the indefiniteness analysis in an example that follows.
The definiteness requirement is specified in 35 U.S.C. § 112(b),
which requires that the "specification shall conclude with one or
more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the
subject matter" of the invention.11 4 The United States Supreme
Court recently clarified this statutory standard by ruling that "a
patent is invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the
specification delineating the patent, and the prosecution history,
fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art
about the scope of the invention."11 5 The "reasonable certainty"
standard balances two interests. On the one hand, patent claims
should provide the public with "clear notice" of the exclusionary
rights provided by the patent.116 Distinct claims "guard against un-
reasonable advantages to the patentee and disadvantages to others
arising from uncertainty as to their [respective] rights."11 7 On the
other hand, "the definiteness requirement must take into account
the inherent limitations of language."11 8 Accepting some uncer-
tainty is the "price of ensuring the appropriate incentives for inno-
vation."119
Claim definiteness is a question of law that the courts review
without deference.120 This flows from a court's obligation to con-
strue claims de novo.121 Nevertheless, the definiteness inquiry de-
pends on "the understanding of a skilled artisan at the time of the
patent application, not that of a court viewing matters post hoc."
' 122
Thus, the level of skill of the person having ordinary skill in the art
is relevant to definiteness. 123
114. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b).
115. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 901 (2014) (emphasis added).
116. Id. at 909-10. Clear notice is necessary to avoid '[a] zone of uncertainty which enter-
prise and experimentation may enter only at the risk of infringement claims." Id. (quoting
United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942)).
117. General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (1938) (citing Brooks
v. Fiske, 56 U.S. 212, 215 (1853)).
118. Nautilus, Inc., 572 U.S. at 909 (citing Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Ka-
bushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002)).
119. Id. (quoting Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 732).
120. Star Sci., Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 655 F.3d 1364, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
121. Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky Med. Grp., Inc., 554 F.3d 1010, 1022 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
122. Nautilus, Inc., 572 U.S. at 911.
123. AllVoice Computing PLC v. Nuance Commc'ns, Inc., 504 F.3d 1236, 1240 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (citing Miles Labs., Inc. v. Shandon, Inc., 997 F.2d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
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One commentator has suggested that it can be helpful to consider
two distinct types of definiteness, linguistic and physical.124 Claims
that can be construed in more than one way by the person of ordi-
nary skill are linguistically indefinite, while claims whose single
meaning does not sufficiently delineate a necessary relationship
among claim elements are physically indefinite. For example,
claims "with comparative terms or ambiguous spatial relationships
between claim elements fail to meet the physical-definiteness re-
quirement." 12
5
The review of the legal standard for indefiniteness highlights sev-
eral types of information, each of which can be relevant depending
on the facts in the case at hand. Listed below are several types of
information which can be automatically extracted from patent text.
Accompanying each is a brief description of the potential relevance
of the information to the indefiniteness inquiry. For simplicity, I
present only three types of information, each of which involves only
features related to claim terms. Many additional types of infor-
mation are relevant to indefiniteness, some possessing a very dif-
ferent character than the types listed below.
126
1. Claim term is not defined or not used in the specification.
The definiteness of a claim depends on whether the terms used
in the claim have ascertainable meanings, so an inspection of claim
terms is useful to the indefiniteness analysis.127 The mere presence
or absence of a definition for a claim term is information potentially
useful to the indefiniteness analysis. If a claim term is not defined
in the specification, then this suggests that the claim is (at least
somewhat) less likely to be definite; the patent's specification might
not provide the person of ordinary skill with enough information to
124. Gary M. Fox, Student Note, Understanding Nautilus's Reasonable-Certainty Stand-
ard: Requirements for Linguistic and Physical Definiteness of Patent Claims, 116 MICH. L.
REV. 329, 347-48 (2017).
125. Id. at 342.
126. The Center for Al and Patent Analysis (CAPA) at Carnegie Mellon University con-
ducts original research on new classes of Al tools for various users of the patent system.
Several projects involve NLP systems for partially-automated patent analysis, including a
more extensive version of the patent indefiniteness project described here.
127. Cox Commc'ns, Inc. v. Sprint Commc'n Co., 838 F.3d 1224, 1232 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
("[T]he common practice of training questions of indefiniteness on individual claim terms is
a helpful tool. Indeed, if a person of ordinary skill in the art cannot discern the scope of a
claim with reasonable certainty, it may be because one or several claim terms cannot be re-
liably construed.").
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understand the meaning of the term.128 Nevertheless, if no defini-
tion is provided, mere usage of the term in the patent can be suffi-
ciently informative "if the meaning of the term is fairly inferable
from the patent."129 What is most relevant is whether the claim
term is well understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and thus
would not need any explanation or clarification in the patent.
130
2. Claim term is coined.
The patent drafter is permitted to use claim terms of her own
devising.131 That is, the patent drafter may have invented a new
term rather than used a term known in the literature of the rele-
vant technical field. Such terms need not have ever appeared in
any previous publication or patent. If the term has never appeared
in any previous publication or patent, then it is possible that the
person of ordinary skill would not ascribe a definite meaning to the
term.132 If so, it is incumbent on the patent drafter to define the
custom term, 133 or risk the claim being considered indefinite. 
134
3. Claim term is potentially vague.
Terms denoting unspecified limits, including terms of degree and
inherently vague adjectives, can be problematic. The inclusion of
such words increases the likelihood that the claim does not have the
requisite amount of certainty to satisfy the definiteness require-
ment. In patent claims, this can occur with the use of the modifier
"substantially." For example, the claim may include a term of de-
128. Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 359 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(explaining that although claim terms need not necessarily be defined in the patent, a defi-
nition avoids a "time-consuming and difficult inquiry into indefiniteness").
129. Id.
130. Verve, LLC v. Crane Cams, Inc., 311 F.3d 1116, 1119-20 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
131. See, e.g., Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(noting that a patentee may choose to be his own lexicographer).
132. See Advanced Ground Info. Sys., Inc. v. Lif&360, Inc., 830 F.3d 1341, 1348-49 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (holding that claim term "symbol generator" was not a term of art and was indefi-
nite).
133. Cf. Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1582 ('[A] patentee may choose to be his own lexicog-
rapher and use terms in a manner other than their ordinary meaning, as long as the special
definition of the term is clearly stated in the patent specification or file history.").
134. Capital See. Sys., Inc. v. NCR Corp., 725 Fed. App'x 952, 959 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (affirm-
ing district court's holding of indefiniteness because the claim term "transactional operator"




gree, such as a distance between components that must be "sub-
stantially equal to"135 some amount, a balloon that must be "sub-
stantially filled," 136 or a chemical that does not "interfere substan-
tially" 137 with some capability. To avoid indefiniteness, there must
be "some standard for measuring that degree,"138 either in the pa-
tent itself or from the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the
art.139 If the claim provides "enough certainty to one of skill in the
art when read in the context of the invention," then the claim is not
indefinite. 14
0
Other words besides modifiers introduce a potentially-indefinite
term of degree into the claim. For example, adjectives such as "frag-
ile" can be ambiguous as to the requisite degree of the fragility of
the gel, thus rendering the term indefinite.141 Similarly, the claim
term "at least partially soluble in water" has been held to be im-
properly vague. 
142
However, definiteness does not require that the claim provide
mathematical precision.143 Terms of degree without numerical lim-
its can nevertheless be considered definite, particularly if the rele-
vant field of technology admits no more precise way of specifying
the invention. 144 The key issue is whether the specification provides
some standard for measuring that degree.
145
In summary, it would be useful for Al software to assist in the
indefiniteness analysis by identifying in the patent (and possibly in
other patents as well): (1) whether the terms in the claims are de-
fined or used in the patent, (2) whether the claim term appears to
be coined rather than in common usage, and (3) whether any claim
135. Seattle Box Co. v. Indus. Crating & Packing, Inc., 731 F.2d 818, 821 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
136. Tinnus Enters., v. Telebrands Corp., 846 F.3d 1190, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
137. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Applera Corp., 599 F.3d 1325, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Though
the term "not interfering substantially" does not provide a precise numerical measurement,
the intrinsic evidence provided "a general guideline and examples sufficient to enable a per-
son of ordinary skill in the art to determine [the scope of the claims]." Id. at 1335 (quoting
In re Marosi, 710 F.2d 799, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
138. Id. at 1332 (quoting Seattle Box Co., 731 F.2d at 826).
139. Verve, LLC v. Crane Cams, Inc., 311 F.3d 1116, 1119-20 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
140. Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 783 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quot-
ing Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 766 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
141. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
142. Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 453 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
143. Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 424 F.3d 1374, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Sonix
Tech. Co. v. Pubins Int'l, Ltd., 844 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ("Because language is
limited," terms of degree are not inherently indefinite.).
144. Rosemount, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 727 F.2d 1540, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(affirming a district court's holding that the term "close proximity' is as precise as the subject
matter permits).
145. Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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terms are inherently vague words. Further, aggregating this infor-
mation, such as for each claim or each claim term, would help the
lawyer quickly assess the totality of the evidence presented by the
software. One way to aggregate this information would be to simply
present all information in a list for the lawyer's review. Another
way to aggregate this information would be to develop a simple
score, such as counting the percentage of claim terms that lack a
definition or counting the number of vague terms in the claims.
This type of simple score would allow the lawyer to rapidly assess a
large number of patents and would focus the lawyer's attention on
the patents most likely to merit further review.
CONCLUSION
A review of contemporary NLP software reveals both impressive
capabilities as well as serious shortcomings. The inability of NLP
software to perform robust commonsense reasoning and utilize
shared background knowledge prevents many types of legal analy-
sis from being fully automated. Nevertheless, an appropriate divi-
sion of labor between the lawyer and the computer enables a new
class of partially-automated legal analysis. NLP tools designed
with the aid of the legal expert can exploit concrete knowledge of
case law, allowing software to identify in legal texts different types
of information used in conducting specific forms of legal analysis.
This type of NLP tool would be tailored to a narrow field of law but
would thereby leverage profound expertise in that field to more ac-
curately identify, aggregate, and display relevant information to
the legal decision maker. Though such NLP software would not
perform all of the steps in the desired legal analysis, the software
would allow the user to search for and utilize necessary information
faster than if the user worked unaided.
This paradigm is especially useful in the field of patent law be-
cause the patent document contains in text form much of the infor-
mation necessary to perform different types of legal analysis. More-
over, knowledge of the drafting techniques of patent attorneys can
be employed to better understand how different types of relevant
information can be expressed in text form. This in turn leads to
more effective NLP techniques to extract that information. It is
hoped that this process for designing NLP software will facilitate
greater exposure to NLP software by those in the legal field and
foster more collaboration between the Machine Learning and legal
communities.
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